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Abstract
In Bayesian statistics, the marginal likelihood, also known as the evidence, is used to evaluate
model fit as it quantifies the joint probability of the data under the prior. In contrast, non-Bayesian
models are typically compared using cross-validation on held-out data, either through k-fold par-
titioning or leave-p-out subsampling. We show that the marginal likelihood is formally equivalent
to exhaustive leave-p-out cross-validation averaged over all values of p and all held-out test sets
when using the log posterior predictive probability as the scoring rule. Moreover, the log pos-
terior predictive is the only coherent scoring rule under data exchangeability. This offers new
insight into the marginal likelihood and cross-validation and highlights the potential sensitivity
of the marginal likelihood to the setting of the prior. We suggest an alternative approach using
aggregate cross-validation following a preparatory training phase. Our work has connections to
prequential analysis and intrinsic Bayes factors but is motivated through a different course.
1 Introduction
Probabilistic model evaluation and selection is an important task in statistics and machine learning,
particularly when multiple models are under initial consideration. In the non-Bayesian literature,
models are typically compared using out-of-sample performance criteria such as cross-validation
[Geisser and Eddy, 1979, Shao, 1993, Vehtari and Lampinen, 2002], or predictive information
[Watanabe, 2010]. Computing the leave-p-out cross-validation score requires n-choose-p test set
evaluations for n data points, which in most cases is computationally unviable and hence approxi-
mations such as k-fold cross-validation are often used instead [Geisser, 1975]. A survey is provided
by Arlot and Celisse [2010], and a Bayesian perspective on cross-validation by Vehtari and Ojanen
[2012], Gelman et al. [2014].
In Bayesian statistics, the marginal likelihood or model evidence is the natural measure of model
fit. For a modelM with likelihood function or sampling distribution {fθ(y) : θ ∈ Θ} parameterised
by θ, a prior pi(θ), and observations y1:n ∈ Yn, the marginal likelihood or the prior predictive is
defined as
pM(y1:n) =
∫
fθ(y1:n) dpi(θ) . (1)
Themarginal likelihood can be used to calculate the posterior probability of the model given the data,
p(M | y1:n) ∝ pM(y1:n) p(M), as it is the probability of the data being generated under the prior
when the model is correctly specified [Robert, 2007, Chapter 7]. The ratio of marginal likelihoods
between models is known as the Bayes factor that quantifies the prior to posterior odds on observing
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the data. The marginal likelihood can be difficult to compute if the likelihood is peaked with respect
to the prior, althoughMonte Carlo solutions exist; see Robert andWraith [2009] for a survey. Under
vague priors, the marginal likelihood may also be highly sensitive to the prior dispersion even if the
posterior is not; a well known example is Lindley’s paradox [Lindley, 1957, O’Hagan and Forster,
2004, Robert, 2013]. As a result, its approximations such as the Bayesian information criterion
[Schwarz, 1978] or the deviance information criterion [Spiegelhalter et al., 2002] are widely used,
see also Gelman et al. [2014].
For our work, it is useful to note from the property of probability distributions that the log
marginal likelihood can be written as the sum of log conditionals,
log pM(y1:n) =
n∑
i=1
log pM(yi | y1:i−1) (2)
where pM(yi | y1:i−1) =
∫
fθ(yi) dpi(θ | y1:i−1) is the posterior predictive for i > 1, pM(y1 | y1:0)
=
∫
fθ(y1) dpi(θ) , and this representation is true for any permutation of the data indices.
While Bayesian inference formally assumes that the model space captures the truth, in the
model misspecified or so called M -open scenario [Bernardo and Smith, 2009, Chapter 6] the log
marginal likelihood can be simply interpreted as a predictive sequential, or prequential [Dawid,
1984], scoring rule of the form S(y1:n) =
∑
i s(yi | y1:i−1) with score function s(yi | y1:i−1) =
log pM(yi | y1:i−1). This interpretation of the log marginal likelihood as a predictive score [Kass
and Raftery, 1995, Gneiting and Raftery, 2007, Bernardo and Smith, 2009, Chapter 6] has resulted
in alternative scoring functions for Bayesian model selection [Dawid and Musio, 2014, 2015, Wat-
son and Holmes, 2016, Shao et al., 2018], and provides insight into the relationship between the
marginal likelihood and posterior predictive methods [Vehtari and Ojanen, 2012]. Key et al. [1999]
considered cross-validation from anM -open perspective and introduced a mixture utility for model
selection that trades off fidelity to data with predictive power.
2 Uniqueness of the marginal likelihood under coherent scoring
To begin, we prove that under an assumption of data exchangeability, the log posterior predictive is
the only prequential scoring rule that guarantees coherent model evaluation. The coherence prop-
erty under exchangeability, where the indices of the data points carry no information, refers to the
principle that identical models on seeing the same data should be scored equally irrespective of data
ordering.
In demonstrating the uniqueness of the log posterior predictive, it is useful to introduce the notion
of a general Bayesian model [Bissiri et al., 2016], which is a framework for Bayesian updating
without the requirement of a true model. Define a parameter of interest by
θ0 = argmin
θ
∫
l(θ, y)dF0(y) (3)
where F0(y) is the unknown true sampling distribution giving rise to the data, and l : Θ × Y →
[0,∞) is a loss function linking an observation y to the parameter θ. Bissiri et al. [2016] argue
that after observing y1:n, a coherent update of beliefs about θ0 from a prior piG(θ) to the posterior
piG(θ | y1:n) exists and must take on the form
piG(θ | y1:n) ∝ exp {−wl(θ, y1:n)}piG(θ) (4)
where l(θ, y1:n) =
∑
i l(θ, yi) is an additive loss function and w > 0 is a loss scale parameter; see
Holmes and Walker [2017], Lyddon et al. [2019] on the selection of w. For w = 1 and l(θ, y) =
2
− log fθ(y), we obtain traditional Bayesian updating without assuming the model fθ(y) is true for
some value of θ. From (3), M -open Bayesian inference is simply targeting the value of θ that
minimizes the Kullback-Leibler divergence between dF0(y) and fθ(y). The form (4) is uniquely
implied by the assumptions in Theorem 1 of Bissiri et al. [2016], and we now focus on the coherence
property of the update rule. An update function ψ(l(θ, y), piG(θ)) = piG(θ | y) is coherent if, for
some inputs y1:2, it satisfies
ψ[l(θ, y2), ψ{l(θ, y1), piG(θ)}] = ψ{l(θ, y1) + l(θ, y2), piG(θ)}
This coherence condition is natural under an assumption of exchangeability as we expect posterior
inferences about θ0 to be unchanged whether we observe y1:2 in any order or all at once, as it is in
traditional Bayesian updating.
We now extend this coherence condition to general Bayesian model choice, where the goal is
to evaluate the fit of the observed data under the general Bayesian model class MG = {l(θ, y) :
θ ∈ Θ}with a prior piG(θ). We treatw as a parameter outside of the model specification, as there are
principled methods to select it from the model, prior and data. We define the log posterior predictive
score as
sG(y˜ | y1:n) = log
∫
g{l(θ, y˜)}dpiG(θ | y1:n)
where g : [0,∞) → [0,∞) is a continuous monotonically decreasing scoring function that trans-
forms l(θ, y) into a predictive score for a test point y˜. We define the cumulative prequential log score
as
SG(y1:n) =
n∑
i=1
sG(yi | y1:i−1)
where sG(y1 | y1:0) = log
∫
g{l(θ, y1)}dpiG(θ). The cumulative prequential log score sums the
log posterior predictive score of each consecutive data point in a prequential manner, where a large
score indicates that the model is predicting well. An intuitive choice for the scoring function might
be the negative loss g(l) = −l, but we will see that this violates coherency, as defined below.
Definition 1. The model scoring function g(l) is coherent if it satisfies
n∑
i=1
sG(yi | y1:i−1) = log
∫
g{l(θ, y1:n)}dpiG(θ) (5)
for all Θ, pi(θ) and n > 0, such that SG(y1:n) is invariant to the ordering or partitioning of the
observations.
We now present our main result on the uniqueness of the choice of g.
Proposition 1. If the model scoring function g : [0,∞) → [0,∞) is continuous, monotonically
decreasing and coherent, then the unique choice of scoring rule g(l) is
g(l) = exp(−wl)
where w is the loss-scale in the general Bayesian posterior.
Proof. The proof is given in A.1 of the Appendix.
This holds irrespective of whether the model is true or not. More importantly for us is the
corollary below.
3
Corollary 1. The marginal likelihood is the unique coherent marginal score for Bayesian inference.
Proof. Let w = 1 and l(θ, y) = − log fθ(y), and hence g{l(θ, y)} = fθ(y).
The marginal likelihood arises naturally as the unique prequential scoring rule under coherent
belief updating in the Bayesian framework. The coherence of the marginal likelihood implies an
invariance to the permutation of the observations y1:n under exchangeability, including independent
and identically distributed data, a property that is not shared by other prequential scoring rules, such
as Dawid and Musio [2014], Gru¨nwald and van Ommen [2017], Shao et al. [2018].
3 The marginal likelihood and cross-validation
3.1 Equivalence of the marginal likelihood and aggregate cross-validation
The leave-p-out cross-validation score is defined as
SCV (y1:n; p) =
1(
n
p
) (
n
p)∑
t=1
1
p
p∑
j=1
s
(
y˜
(t)
j | y
(t)
1:n−p
)
(6)
where y˜
(t)
1:p denotes the t’th of n-choose-p possible held-out test sets, with y
(t)
1:n−p the corresponding
training set, such that y1:n =
{
y˜(t), y(t)
}
, and SCV records the average predictive score per datum.
Although leave-one-out cross-validation is a popular choice, it was shown in Shao [1993] that it
is asymptotically inconsistent for a linear model selection problem, and requires {p/n} → 1 as
n → ∞ for consistency. We will not go into further detail here but instead refer the reader to Arlot
and Celisse [2010]. Selecting a larger p has the interpretation of penalizing complexity [Vehtari and
Ojanen, 2012], as complex models will tend to over-fit to a small training set. However, the number
of test set evaluations grows rapidly with p and hence k-fold cross-validation is often adopted for
computational convenience.
From a Bayesian perspective it is natural to consider the log posterior predictive as the scoring
function, s(y˜ | y) = log
∫
fθ(y˜)dpi(θ | y), particularly as we have now shown that it is the only
coherent scoring mechanism, which leads us to the following result.
Proposition 2. The Bayesian marginal likelihood is equivalent to the aggregate leave-p-out cross-
validation score using the log posterior predictive as the scoring rule, such that
log pM(y1:n) =
n∑
p=1
SCV (y1:n; p) (7)
with s(y˜j | y1:n−p) = log pM(y˜j | y1:n−p) = log
∫
fθ(y˜j) dpi(θ | y1:n−p).
Proof. This follows from the invariance of the marginal likelihood under arbitrary permutation of
the sequence y1:n in (2). We provide more detailed explanations in A.2, A.3 of the Appendix.
The Bayesian marginal likelihood is simply n times the average leave-p-out cross-validation
score, n× (1/n)
∑n
p=1 SCV (y1:n; p), where the scaling by n is due to (6) being a per datum score.
Bayesian models are evaluated through out-of-sample predictions on all (2n − 1) possible held-
out test sets whereas cross-validation with fixed p only captures a snapshot of model performance.
Evaluating the predictive performance on (2n− 1) test sets would appear intractable for most appli-
cations, but we see through (7) and (1) that it is computable as a single integral.
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3.2 Sensitivity to the prior and preparatory training
The representation of the marginal likelihood as an aggregate cross-validation score (7) provides
insight into the sensitivity to the prior. The last term in the right hand side of (7) involves no training
data, SCV (y1:n;n) = (1/n)
∑n
i=1 log
∫
fθ(yi) dpi(θ), which scores the model entirely on how well
the analyst is able to specify the prior. In many situations, the analyst may not want this term to
contribute to model evaluation. Moreover, there is tension between any desire to specify vague
priors to safeguard their influence and the fact that diffuse priors can lead to an arbitrarily large and
negative model score for real valued parameters from (7). It may seem inappropriate to penalize
a model based on the subjective ability to specify the prior, or to compare models using a score
that includes contributions from predictions made using only a handful of training points even with
informative priors. For example, we see that 10% of terms contributing to the marginal likelihood
come from out-of-sample predictions using, on average, less than 5% of available training data. This
is related to the start-up problem in prequential analysis [Dawid, 1992].
A natural and obvious solution is to begin evaluating the model performance after a preparatory
phase, for example using 10% or 50% of the data as preparatory training prior to testing. This leads
to a Bayesian aggregate leave-P -out cross-validation score defined as
SACV (y1:n;P ) =
P∑
p=1
SCV (y1:n; p) (8)
with a matched preparatory cross-validation score SPCV (y1:n;P ) =
∑n
p=P+1 SCV (y1:n; p), for
1 ≤ P < n. We suggest setting P to leave out 0.9n, 0.5n or max(0.9n, n − 10d), where d is
the total number of model parameters, as reasonable default choices, but clearly this is situation
specific. One may be interested in reporting both SACV and SPCV , as the latter can be regarded
as an evaluation of the prior, but we suggest that only SACV is used for model evaluation from the
arguments above. Although full coherency is now lost, we still have coherency conditioned on a
preparatory training set, where permutation of the data within the training and test sets does not
affect the score, and so we can write (8) as
SACV (y1:n;P ) =
1(
n
P
) (
n
P)∑
t=1
log pM
(
y˜
(t)
1:P | y
(t)
1:n−P
)
. (9)
This equivalence is derived in A.4 of the Appendix in a similar fashion to Proposition 2. This has
precisely the form of the the log geometric intrinsic Bayes factor of Berger and Pericchi [1996] but
motivated by a different route. The intrinsic Bayes factor was developed in an objective Bayesian
setting [Berger and Pericchi, 2001], where improper priors cause indeterminacies in the evaluation
of the marginal likelihood. The intrinsic Bayes factor remedies this with a partition of the data into
y1:l, yl+1:n, where y1:l is the minimum training sample used to convert an improper prior pi(θ) into
a proper prior pi(θ | y1:l). In contrast, we set n− P to provide preparatory training and pi(θ) can be
subjective. Moreover, in modern applications we often have d ≫ n where intrinsic Bayes factors
cannot be applied in their original form.
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We can approximate (9) through Monte Carlo where the training data sets y
(t)
1:n−P are drawn
uniformly at random, and for non-conjugate models the inner term must also be estimated, for
example through
SˆACV (y1:n;P ) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
log
{
1
B
B∑
b=1
f
θ
(t)
b
(
y˜
(t)
1:P
)}
(10)
where samples θ
(t)
b ∼ pi
(
θ | y
(t)
1:n−P
)
are obtained via Markov chain Monte Carlo. In A.5 of the
Appendix we provide some further details on efficient computation of (10).
4 Illustration for the normal linear model
We illustrate the use of Bayesian aggregate cross-validation in a polynomial regression example,
where the r-th polynomial model is defined as
fθ(y | x, r) = N (y; θ
Tφr(x), σ
2), φr(x) =
[
1 x . . . xr−1 xr
]T
.
We observe the data {y1:n, x1:n}, and we place a fixed vague prior on the intercept term, θ0 ∼
N (θ0; 0, 100
2), and θd ∼ N (θd; 0, s
2) for d ∈ {1, . . . , r} on the remaining coefficients. In our
example, we have n = 100 and the true model is r = 1, θ =
[
1 0.5
]T
with known σ2 = 1. For
our prior, we vary the value of s2 ∈
{
10−1, 100, 104
}
to investigate the impact of the prior tails. For
each prior setting, we calculate log pM(y1:n) and SACV (y1:n;P ) for models r ∈ {0, 1, 2}. In this
example, log pM(y1:n) is tractable, whereas SACV requires a Monte Carlo average over tractable
log posterior predictives. We report the mean over 10 runs of estimating SACV with T = 10
6
random training/test splits. We calculate the Monte Carlo standard error over the 10 runs and report
the maximum for each setting of P .
The results are shown in Table 1, where the highest scoring model is in bold for each setting of s2,
and SˆACV is normalized to be on the same scale as log pr(y1:n). Under the strong prior s
2 = 10−1
and the moderate prior s2 = 100, the marginal likelihood correctly identifies the true model, but
when we increase s2 to 104 it heavily over-penalizes the more complex models and prefers r = 0.
In fact, the magnitude of the marginal likelihood and the discrepancy just described can be made
arbitrarily large by simply increasing s2, which should be guarded against when a modeller has weak
prior beliefs. This issue is not observed with SˆACV for the values of P we consider. The vague prior
does not impede the ability of SˆACV to correctly identify the true model r = 1 and the scores are
stable within each column of P .
In A.6 of the Appendix, we present graphical tools for exploring the aggregate cross-validation
and the effect of the choice of P on SACV . In A.7 of the Appendixwe provide an additional example
using probit regression on the Pima Indian data set .
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Table 1: Log marginal likelihoods and aggregate cross-validation scores for normal linear model
s2 Model log pr(y1:n) SˆACV (y1:n;P )× n/P
r P = 0.9n P = 0.5n M = 0.1n
10−1 0 -158.82 -153.80 -153.21 -153.06
1 -155.57 -150.39 -149.55 -149.27
2 -156.12 -150.94 -149.81 -149.38
100 0 -158.82 -153.80 -153.21 -153.06
1 -156.26 -150.77 -149.66 -149.34
2 -157.80 -151.90 -150.04 -149.50
104 0 -158.82 -153.80 -153.21 -153.06
1 -160.81 -150.91 -149.68 -149.35
2 -166.93 -152.30 -150.08 -149.53
Maximum standard error 0.002 0.008 0.023
5 Discussion
We have shown that for coherence, the unique scoring rule for Bayesian model evaluation in either
M -open orM -closed is provided by the log posterior predictive probability, and that the marginal
likelihood is equivalent to an aggregate cross-validation score over all training-test data partitions.
The coherence flows from the fact that the scoring rule and the Bayesian update both use the same
information, namely the likelihood function, which is appropriate as the alternative would be to
learn and score under different criteria. If we are interested in an alternative loss function to the log
likelihood, we advocate a general Bayesian update [Bissiri et al., 2016, Lyddon et al., 2019] that
targets the parameters minimising the expected loss, with models evaluated using the corresponding
coherent aggregate cross-validation score.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We look at the case where Θ = {0, 1}, so the prior piG(θ) is parametrised by p ∈ [0, 1] with
piG(θ = 0) = p. We let n = 2, denoting the observables as y1, y2. We further denote l(0, y1) = l0
and l(1, y1) = l1, and likewise l(0, y2) = h0 and l(1, y2) = h1. We write p1 as the updated
piG(θ = 0 | y1) obtained from the general Bayesian update (4). The function g(l) must then satisfy
{g(l0)p+ g(l1)(1− p)} {g(h0)p1 + g(h1)(1− p1)}
= {g(l0 + h0)p+ g(l1 + h1)(1− p)}
(A.1.1)
for all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and for all l0, l1, h0, h1 ∈ [0,∞). If we let p = 1, then p1 = 1, so this simplifies
to
g(l0)g(h0) = g(l0 + h0).
As g is continuous and monotonically decreasing, to satisfy (5) it must take on the form
g(l) = exp(−λl) (A.1.2)
for λ ≥ 0. We now explicitly write out the form of p1
p1 =
exp(−wl0)p
exp(−wl0)p+ exp(−wl1)(1− p)
=
exp(−wl0)p
Z1
. (A.1.3)
If we plug (A.1.2), (A.1.3) into (A.1.1), we obtain
{exp(−λl0)p+ exp(−λl1)(1 − p)} {exp(−λh0) exp(−wl0)p+ exp(−λh1) exp(−wl1)(1− p)}
= Z1 {exp(−λ(l0 + h0))p+ exp(−λ(l1 + h1))(1− p)} .
Expanding, cancelling terms, and simplifying we obtain
exp(−λl1 − wl0){exp(−λh0)− exp(−λh1)} = exp(−λl0 − wl1){exp(−λh0)− exp(−λh1)}
and so we must have λ = 0 or λ = w, where only the latter solution is non-trivial. We have thus
shown that for n = 2, |Θ| = 2, the unique non-trivial solution to (5) is
g(l) = exp(−wl). (A.1.4)
The remainder of the proof involves showing that this choice of g satisfies (5) for all n > 0 and all
Θ and pi(θ). Subbing (A.1.4) into (5), we obtain
n∏
i=1
exp {sG(yi | y1:i−1)} =
n∏
i=1
∫
exp{−wl(θ, yi)}
exp {−wl(θ, y1:i−1)} dpiG(θ)∫
exp {−wl(θ′, y1:i−1)} dpiG(θ′)
=
n∏
i=1
∫
exp {−wl(θ, y1:i)} dpiG(θ)∫
exp {−wl(θ′, y1:i−1)} dpiG(θ′)
=
∫
exp {−wl(θ, y1:n)} dpiG(θ)
where for convenience we denote l(θ, y1:0) = 0.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Consider the (n! × n) matrix Z with elements (Z)ti = log pM(y
(t)
i | y
(t)
1:i−1), such that
the t’th row of Z records the prequential sequence of log posterior predictives under the t’th of n!
permutations of y1:n. By the property of conditional probabilities, we have that the row sums of Z
are equal,
∑
i(Z)ti =
∑
i(Z)t′i for all t, t
′, and hence
log pM(y1:n) =
1
n!
n!∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
(Z)ti =
n∑
i=1
1
n!
n!∑
t=1
(Z)ti.
Within each column of Z , the values (Z)ti are invariant to the permutation of y1:i−1 in the
preceding i − 1 columns under exchangeability. There are thus n-choose-(i − 1) distinct training
sets and n− i+1 choices for yi given the training set. For each column i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we can then
write
1
n!
n!∑
t=1
(Z)ti =
1(
n
i−1
) (
n
i−1)∑
t=1
1
n− i+ 1
n−i+1∑
j=1
s
(
y˜
(t)
j | y
(t)
1:i−1
)
= SCV (y1:n;n− i+ 1)
where s
(
y˜
(t)
j | y
(t)
1:i−1
)
= log pM
(
y˜
(t)
j | y
(t)
1:i−1
)
. We have the result if we let p = n− i+ 1.
A.3 Alternative proof of Proposition 2
We first begin by showing the following proposition.
Proposition 3. For a preparatory cross-validation score, SPCV (y1:n;P ), defined as the sum of
cross-validation terms from leave-(P + 1)-out to leave-n-out,
SPCV (y1:n;P ) =
n∑
p=P+1
SCV (y1:n; p),
we have the following equivalence relationship
SPCV (y1:n;P ) =
1(
n
P
) (
n
P)∑
t=1
log pM
(
y
(t)
1:n−P
)
(A.3.1)
which states that SPCV is the average log marginal likelihood over all choices of the training set.
Proof. To show this, we use a proof by induction. We see that (A.3.1) is trivially true for P = n−1,
as this is simply SCV (y1:n;n). Assuming (A.3.1) holds for some 1 ≤ P ≤ n− 1, we have
SPCV (y1:n;P − 1) = SPCV (y1:n;P ) + SCV (y1:n;P )
=
1(
n
P
) (
n
P)∑
t=1
log pM
(
y
(t)
1:n−P
)
+
1(
n
P
) (
n
P)∑
t=1
1
P
P∑
j=1
log pM
(
y˜
(t)
j | y
(t)
1:n−P
)
=
1
P
(
n
P
) (
n
P)∑
t=1

P log pM
(
y
(t)
1:n−P
)
+
P∑
j=1
log pM
(
y˜
(t)
j | y
(t)
1:n−P
)
 .
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From the properties of conditional probability, we can write
SPCV (y1:n;P − 1) =
1
P
(
n
P
) (
n
P)∑
t=1
P∑
j=1
log pM
(
y˜
(t)
j , y
(t)
1:n−P
)
. (A.3.2)
Again, the marginal likelihood is invariant to the permutation of the sequence under data exchange-
ability, so we have to consider the repetitions in the partitions y˜
(t)
j , y
(t)
1:n−P . For each of the n choose
(n− P + 1) unordered sequences y
(t′)
1:n−P+1, there are (n− P + 1) partitions into y˜
(t)
j , y
(t)
1:n−P , so
there are n− P + 1 repetitions of each unordered y
(t′)
1:n−P+1 in (A.3.2). We can thus write
SPCV (y1:n;P − 1) =
(n− P + 1)
P
(
n
P
) (
n
P−1)∑
t′=1
log pM
(
y
(t′)
1:n−P+1
)
=
1(
n
P−1
) (
n
P−1)∑
t′=1
log pM
(
y
(t′)
1:n−P+1
)
and by induction we have (A.3.1).
Proposition 2 then follows trivially by setting P = 0 in Proposition 3.
A.4 Derivation of SACV for Bayesian models
The following corollary follows easily from Propositions 2 and 3.
Corollary 2. For the aggregate cross-validation score defined in (8), we have the following equiva-
lence relationship
SACV (y1:n;P ) =
1(
n
P
) (
n
P)∑
t=1
log pM
(
y˜
(t)
1:P | y
(t)
1:n−P
)
.
Proof. We note that log pM(y1:n) = SACV (y1:n;P ) + SPCV (y1:n;P ) from their definitions and
Proposition 2. From the permutation invariance of the marginal likelihood, we can write
log pM(y1:n) =
1(
n
P
) (
n
P)∑
t=1
log pM
(
y˜
(t)
1:P , y
(t)
1:n−P
)
. (A.4.1)
By subtracting A.3.1 in Proposition 3 from A.4.1 and regarding each term in the summation, we
have
SACV (y1:n;P ) =
1(
n
P
) (
n
P)∑
t=1
{
log pM
(
y˜
(t)
1:P , y
(t)
1:n−P
)
− log pM
(
y
(t)
1:n−P
)}
=
1(
n
P
) (
n
P)∑
t=1
log pM
(
y˜
(t)
1:P | y
(t)
1:n−P
)
.
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A.5 Computing SACV
To avoid the need for T Markov chain Monte Carlo chains in (10), we can take advantage of the fact
that the partial posteriors for different training sets will be similar, and utilize importance sampling
[Bhattacharya et al., 2007, Vehtari et al., 2017] or sequential Monte Carlo [Bornn et al., 2010] to
estimate the posterior predictives for computational savings. We also note that SˆACV in (10) is a
biased estimate, and Rischard et al. [2018] provides unbiased estimators of log pM(y˜1:P | y1:n−P )
directly through unbiased Markov chain Monte Carlo and path sampling methods.
The arithmetic averaging over training/test splits SˆACV may also be inherently unstable, as
demonstrated by the following example. Suppose that y is a binary random variable which takes on
either 0 or 1 with equal probability, and we are attempting to estimate SACV (y1:n;n/2). For large
n, it is likely that approximately half of the values in y1:n are equal to 0 and the other half to 1.
There will thus exist a permutation of the sequence y1:n such that almost all the first n/2 values are
equal to 0, with the remaining almost all equal to 1. The model will then be certain that y = 0 after
observing the training set, and score the remaining n/2 points very poorly, giving a large negative
log posterior predictive. This suggests that an arithmetic average may be unstable; the median or
robust trimmed mean over permutations may be stabler alternatives.
The form in (9) relies on the conditional coherency of Bayesian updating and scoring. Without
this, SACV still exists as defined in (8), and can be directly estimated for example through
SˆACV (y1:n;P ) =
P
T
T∑
t=1
1
p(t)
p(t)∑
j=1
s
(
y˜
(t)
j | y
(t)
1:n−p(t)
)
where p(t) ∼ U{1, P} and the training set y
(t)
1:n−p(t)
is sampled uniformly at random conditioned on
p(t). This facilities alternative choices for the belief updating model and s (y˜ | y).
A.6 Visualization of aggregate cross-validation
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Figure A.6.1: Leave-p-out cross-validation score SˆCV (y1:n; p) against n − p (left) and normalized
aggregate cross-validation score SˆACV (y1:n;P )×n/P against n−P (right) for s2 = 1 and p, P ∈
{1, . . . , 99}; the maximum standard error is 0.001 for SˆCV and 0.005 for SˆACV
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A visualization of the effects of the training/preparatory data size is shown in Figure A.6.1 for
s2 = 1. We omit SCV (y1:n;n) and SACV (y1:n;n) for clarity of the plot, as both are significantly
more negative than the other values. On the left we see that the individual cross-validation term
SCV (y1:n; p) prefers the simplest r = 0 model when the training set is very small as over-fitting is
penalized, but as n − p increases, the true r = 1 model overtakes it. The r = 2 model eventually
overtakes the r = 0 model too, and we see the discrepancy between r = 2 and r = 1 decrease as
over-fitting is penalized less and less. This latter effect is demonstrative of how leave-one-out cross-
validation under-penalizes complex models as argued in Shao [1993], and why a value of P > 1
should be preferred. On the right, we observe a similar effect for the aggregate cross-validation
score SACV , but the discrepancy between r = 2 and r = 1 remains more noticeable for moderate
n− P as a cumulative sum of SCV terms is being taken.
A.7 Illustration for the probit model
To demonstrate the aggregate cross-validation score in an intractable example, we carry out model
selection in the Pima Indian benchmark model with a probit model. We observe binary random
variables y1:n with associated r-dimensional covariates x1:n, and the probit model is defined as
fθ(y | x) = (Φ (θ
Tx˜))
y
(1− Φ (θTx˜))1−y
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and x˜ =
[
1 xT
]T
. As suggested
in Marin and Robert [2018], we elicit a g-prior pi(θ) = N
(
θ; 0r+1, g(X
TX)−1
)
where 0r+1 is a
r + 1 vector of 0s andX is the n by r + 1 matrix with rows x˜Ti .
The dataset consists of n = 332 data points and we consider r = 3 covariates consisting of
glu, bp and ped, which correspond to plasma glucose concentration from an oral glucose test,
diastolic blood pressure and diabetes pedigree function respectively. We compare the full model
M0: (glu,bp,ped) withM1: (glu,bp) through log pM(y1:n) and SACV (y1:n;P ) to test for
significance of ped. We standardize all covariates to have 0 mean and variance 1. We calculate
log pM(y1:n) using importance sampling with a Gaussian proposal with 10
3 samples. The proposal
mean is set to the maximum likelihood estimate of θ and proposal covariance to the estimated co-
variance matrix of the maximum likelihood estimate as suggested in Marin and Robert [2018]. For
SACV (y1:n;P ), we estimate each posterior predictive in (10) with the same importance sampling
scheme where we temper the proposal such that its covariance matrix is divided by (n− P )/n. We
also use 103 proposal samples and average over T = 105 random train/test splits. We carry out 10
runs of each and report the mean and maximum standard error as before.
We see in Table A.7.1 that for g = n, the simpler model with ped omitted performs worse for
both scores, and there is thus strong evidence for ped. However, when we set g = 10n, we see that
comparing models via the marginal likelihood suggests that ped is no longer significant, while the
aggregate cross-validation score changes little with this increased variance of the prior. As a sanity
check, we run a Gibbs sampler targeting pi(θ | y1:n, x1:n) for the two prior settings within the full
model M0, and plot the marginal posterior of θped in Figure A.7.1. For reference, the posterior
means of θglu, θbp are 0.70 and 0.12 respectively. The posteriors of θped are indistinguishable for
the two prior settings, with a significant mean for θped. This agrees well with the aggregate cross-
validation score SˆACV which is clearly robust to vague priors.
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Table A.7.1: Log marginal likelihoods and aggregate cross-validation score for probit model
g Model log pM(y1:n) SˆACV (y1:n;P )× n/P
P = 0.9n
n (glu,bp,ped) -168.93 -165.87
(glu,bp) -170.00 -167.37
10n (glu,bp,ped) -173.10 -166.28
(glu,bp) -173.05 -167.64
Maximum standard error 0.004 0.02
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Figure A.7.1: Marginal posterior density plots for θped for different prior scalings g
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